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the fundamental article of his own creed falters, and that pragmatism in teaching the efficiency of "our" thinking is saving idealism from its own unbelief.

From this lack of faith, idealism agrees with realism that *our* ideas can only algebraically represent or "mean" or "point at" a world of reality "beyond." The disagreement consists in the fact that while the realist's ideas are quite content with this rôle, the ideas of the idealist long to swallow, or be swallowed by, the rest of the world.

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## DISCUSSION

### A REPLY TO DR. BROWN

I FEEL compelled to say that one would obtain from Dr. Brown's discussion ("If the Blind Lead the Blind. A Comment on 'Logical Form' in Professor Perry's 'Realistic Program' ")<sup>1</sup> a very incorrect notion of the text on which he proposes to "comment." Dr. Brown's comment relates to somewhat less than one page, taken from one of three sections of an essay of thirty pages. The section to which Dr. Brown refers was entitled: "The Realistic Program of *Reform*," and not, as quoted, "The Realistic Program."<sup>2</sup> In the page referred to, a "regard for logical form" was recommended as one of eight rules of procedure that I believed calculated just now to improve the state of philosophy. And in connection with the matter of "logical form," I urged that the philosopher test his procedure by the canons of modern logic, and avail himself of the technical treatment to which modern logic has submitted certain fundamental concepts such as relation, infinity, etc. In view of these facts, I can scarcely be charged, as is certainly suggested by the title and trend of Dr. Brown's argument, with proposing that philosophy should be merged into logic or slavishly accept its lead.

I have urged attention to the recent work of the symbolic logicians, because it seems to me that these investigators are dealing in a highly abstract and technical way, in other words, in an *exact* way, with certain matters in which philosophy is necessarily involved.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This JOURNAL, Vol. VII., No. 18, p. 491.

<sup>2</sup> Still less was it "Professor Perry's Platform," as stated, probably through no fault of the author, on the title-page.

<sup>3</sup> Dr. Brown's demonstration of the inconsistencies of the logicians is interesting, but it has, so far as I can see, no bearing on the present dispute, which concerns the importance of logic for philosophy. If these inconsistencies were really fatal to logic, then they would be fatal to logic as a "sub-

The virtue of the logician's procedure is its *isolation* of these matters. For example, the philosopher deals with the relation of God to the world, or the relation of the idea to its object; whereas the logician is just now dealing in a very direct and rigorous way with *relation*. Now I am assuming that when one says "relation" one always means at least in some respect *the same thing*; and if that be the case, it will greatly clarify the manifold cases or applications of the concept if one can learn something about its generic character by the method of abstraction. And what is true of the concept of relation is true of such concepts as order, continuity, infinity, space, time, class, propositional function, definition, etc. I have raised no question as to the extent to which such conceptions ought to be employed in metaphysics, but have simply urged that when they are used they be used in that exact sense which logic is seeking to determine. It is doubtless true that many of these conceptions, and others once regarded as mathematical in an exclusive sense, have now become genuinely logical and fundamental. For it has been one result of the logic of mathematics to break down the barrier between logic and mathematics. Nevertheless, I have urged only that such conceptions should be used exactly, *where they are used*.

Thus since Professor Royce conceives the absolute self as infinite, he has done well to make use of the most exact definition of infinite that is available, but it does not follow that there *is* any infinite self, or that such a conception is either significant or profitable. Similarly, I have not urged any extension of "mathematical method" beyond its critical use. I have suggested that philosophy "apply to its own constructive procedure the most refined *tests* of scientific form." Dr. Brown's "suppose it were made the method of development," and his fear of the consequences of an exclusive use of dialectic in philosophy, are, so far as I am concerned, entirely gratuitous. Assuming that philosophers desire their results to be well reasoned and well grounded, I have simply recommended that they avail themselves, *for that purpose*, of the most approved critical methods.

Dr. Brown draws a moral toward the end of his discussion which I suspect is intended for others as well as myself. Combining the mathematical method with the "platform" idea, he becomes terrified at the figment of his own imagination—a company of realists reciting in unison a set of postulates, and leading identical lives deduced from common premisses. Now no realist, so far as I know, has ever ordinate philosophical discipline." But this Dr. Brown does not claim. Hence we must conclude simply that logic, like other sciences, is open to criticism, and that if its results are to be used they must be used with discrimination and not simply be "transferred."

suggested that knowledge is to be advanced solely by deduction from premisses. It is generally agreed, I should suppose, that knowledge is advanced mainly by *finding the premisses*. There can, then, be no question of an initial agreement "on a complete set of postulates." As to agreement in opinion or theory, the idea that lies behind the recent realistic platform is so simple and evident that I confess myself at a loss to argue for it. There is no desire to force agreement, but only a desire to make *implicit* agreement *explicit*, with a view to isolating the matters that remain under dispute, and obtaining a common basis for the discussion of them.

It follows, doubtless, that in so far as discussion promotes agreement, this further agreement should in turn be formulated. But the fear lest this procedure lead to a "dull" or "diseased" unanimity, is much like the fear lest through the success of one's moral efforts the world become too good to be interesting. These are not only groundless fears, but fears that if taken seriously would imply acquiescence in error and evil. Upon the basis of the experiment as so far conducted, I can testify that the encounter of minds that *meet*, is considerably less dull than that blind and aimless discharge of argumentation which is customary within the larger philosophical community.

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#### A NOTE CONCERNING "THE PROGRAM AND FIRST PLATFORM OF SIX REALISTS"<sup>1</sup>

TO me, at least, this platform comes as a distinct disappointment, and this for three reasons: in the first place, it seems to narrow the scope of realism, and cut it off from the deeper content of philosophy; in the second place, its propositions are vague and ambiguous, perhaps from attempting too great generality; and in the third place, it is not evident to me that even these fundamental propositions are accepted in the same sense by all six platformists.

It is not easy to accept frankly the authors' statement that each of the given sets of propositions "has been discussed at length, revised, and agreed to by the other conferees" (p. 394), and in spite of the advantages of a common terminology set forth in the introduction, this instance of "deliberate cooperation" has not embodied that gain. Of course, it is somewhat premature to attempt to pass judgment on a preliminary manifesto, but it may be that others share my difficulties and that an expression of them may aid the platformists to get themselves in a clearer light through further utterances.

<sup>1</sup> This JOURNAL, Vol. VII., No. 15, p. 393.